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The Complex Litigation Project's Tort Choice-of-Law Rules
FriedrichK. Juenger"

I. INTRODUCTION

The American Law Institute's Proposed Final Draft of the Complex
Litigation Project' was approved by the Institute's membership on May 13,

1993.2 In an effort to "enhance the efficiency and economy of handling"' largescale civil litigation, the Project recommends numerous changes in the law of

procedure, venue, and transfer of cases to allow the consolidation, in a single

court, of actions brought in numerous fora. In addition, its Chapter 6 sets forth
a series of choice-of-law provisions designed to govern cases consolidated in
federal courts pursuant to the Project's rules. The Reporters, who profess to
pursue the "objectives of fostering the fair, just, and efficient resolution" 4 of
complex cases, recognized that the most direct way to resolve the substantive law

issues such cases pose would be to adopt uniform national standards.' However,
they rejected this solution because, in their opinion, "the possibilities of reaching

apolitical consensus on what the appropriate federal standard should be, as well
so directly into areas historically governed
as [of] expecting Congress to intrude
6
slim.",
...
appear[ed]
law,
state
by
Worried about perceived political obstacles to an optimal response to the
question of the law applicable to master disaster cases, the Reporters decided to
opt instead for what they call a "procedural solution" 7 whose essential element
is, in their words, a "coherent and uniform federal choice of law code."'
Conceding that conflicts rules amount to "an imperfect solution at best,"' they
nevertheless believe their approach to be workable. In their opinion, federal
choice-of-law provisions governing complex litigation could decrease the forumshopping opportunitiesto created by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co." and Van Dusen v. Barrack.' 2 These Supreme Court decisions, which

Copyright 1994. by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Barrett Professor of Law, University of California at Davis.
I. American Law Institute, Complex Litigation Project. Proposed Final Draft (May 13. 1993)
[hereinafter Proposed Final Draft).
2. See 70 A.L.I. Proceedings (forthcoming 1994) (hereinafter Proceedingsl.
3. Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, ch. 1, cmt. a, at 3; see also id.Ch. 6, Intro. Note, at
376.
4. Id. Ch. 6, Intro. Note, at 375.
5. td.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 376.
10. See id. Ch. 6, Intro. Note, cmt. a, at 376-77.
313 U.S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941).
11.
12. 376 U.S. 612, 84 S. Ct. 805 (1964).
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require federal courts sitting in diversity to apply the choice-of-law rules of the
state in which the action was initially filed, do indeed provide litigants with a
powerful incentive to forum shop among federal courts to maximize their
chances of recovery.' 3 In addition, Klaxon and Van Dusen complicate
considerably the disposition of such dispersed tort cases as In re Agent
Orange, 4 in which multitudes of.actions filed in numerous fora ultimately
ended up in a single judge's lap. Trying each under the law that would have
been applied by the forum in which the action was brought initially would, of
course, be exceedingly cumbersome, time-consuming and potentially unfair.
Presiding over Agent Orange, Judge Weinstein managed to escape the
morass of conflicting state choice-of-law and substantive rules by postulating a
"national consensus law" ' 5 of universal application in all states to govern the
tort law issues presented. By applying uniform rules of decision, he avoided the
conflicts chaos that might have ensued from the Second Circuit's determination
that there was no federal common law to govern the claims of thousands of
servicemen who claimed to have been injured by defoliants sprayed in IndoChina.' 6 Conceding the usefulness of Judge Weinstein's substantive law
approach, the Project's Reporters nevertheless rejected it because of "federalism
constraints"' 7 and asserted "state interests."' 8 For these reasons they espouse
the second best solution, even though they realize that choice-of-law rules do not
allow the consolidated handling of all dispersed torts. 9
The choice-of-law provisions the Reporters have drafted are divided into
several sections. Section 6.01 is devoted to mass torts, Sections 6.02 and 6.03
to mass contracts, Section 6.04 deals with statutes of limitations, Sections 6.05
and 6.06 with damages, and Sections 6.07 and 6.08 contain rules that address
procedural issues concerning the judicial determination of the applicable law.
This comment addresses only the Project's tort choice-of-law rules, limiting itself
largely to a discussion of Section 6.01. In the interest of full disclosure, I should
mention that I was a member of the Project's Consultative Group, whose
meetings I attended on two occasions, on both of which I took issue with the
Reporters' proposed choice-of-law rules. In addition, I raised objections to these
rules with the American Law Institute's Council. At the Institute's 1993 Annual
Meeting, Professors Donald Trautman and Louise Weinberg, as well as myself,

13. See Friedrich K. Jitenger, Forai, Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 Tul. L. Rev.
553, 559 (1989).
14. See i re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Stipp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
15. Id. at 713.
16. hire "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig.. 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. deied. 454
U.S. 1128, 102 S. Ct, 980 (1981). See Georgene M. Vairo, Muiti.Tort Cases: Cause for More
Darkness on the Subject, or a New Rolefor Federal Connon Law?. 54 Fordham L. Rev. 167, 20815 (1985).
17. Proposed Final Draft. supra note I. § 6.01. cmt. c. at 423.
18. Id. See also infra notes 142-147 and accompanying text.
19. Proposed Final Draft. supra note I, § 6.01. cmt. c. at 422. See Linda S. Mullenix.
Federalizing Choice of Law in Mass.Tort Litigation. 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1623, 1630-31. 1644-45 (1992).
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presented motions to substitute provisions we considered more appropriate than

those contained in Section 6.01,20 These motions were defeated,2

I am

pleased the Louisiana Law Review affords me the opportunity for further

comment on why I believe Section 6.01 represents a misguided approach to a
serious problem.
II. THE REPORTERS' SCHEME

The choice-of-law provisions contained in Section 6.01 hearken back to
simpler times. At bottom, they reflect tenets that were in vogue sixty years ago,
when the American Law Institute adopted Professor Joseph Beale's First
Conflicts Restatement."2 At that time it was widely believed that certainty,
predictability, and uniformity of result were the be-all and end-all of the conflict
of laws.2" To pursue these objectives, Professor Beale, the First Restatement's
Reporter, relied on hard and fast rules of a jurisdiction-selecting nature24 that
attempted to allocate each and every legal relationship to a particular state by
means of rigid connecting factors.25 In his scheme, torts were governed by the
law of the place of injury, the lex loci delicti.2 6 Although far more complex
than Beale's simplistic tort choice-of-law rules, Section 6.01, stripped down to
its essentials, has a similar thrust, except that the contact point the Reporters
chose is the place of acting, rather than injury.2 7 The reason for the reemergence of a hard and fast rule similar to the one the Second Restatement

28

29

disavowed more than twenty years ago is obvious. Once the Reporters
decided that the Project's choice-of-law provisions ought to be value-free, ° and
that they should preferably invoke a single state's law, 3 their shape was

20. See Proceedings, supra note 2.
21. See id.
22. Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934).
23. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice 89-90 (1993); Patrick J.
Borchers, Conflicts Pragmatism, 56 AIb. L. Rev. 883, 886-87 (1993).
24. See Juenger, supra note 23, at 89 n.587.
25. See id. at 47-48, 89.
26. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
27. See Restatement of Conflict of Laws §§ 377. 378 (934): 2 Joseph H. Beale. A Treatise
on the Conflict of Laws 1288-90 (1935).
28. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971).
29. See id. at vii-ix. But see Proposed Final Draft. supra note I, § 6.01, cmt. a, at 398
(claiming that the Project's approach is consistent with that of the Second Restatement).
30. See Proposed Final Draft. supra note I. Ch. 6. Intro. Note, cmt. b, at 384 ("neutral and
fair") and cmt. c, at 387 (no "substantive preferences"). See also id. § 6.01. Reporter's Note 12 to
cmt. b, at 419 (rejection of plaintiff's choice of the applicable law) and Reporter's Note 16 to cmt.
c, at 426-27 (rejection of better-law approach).
31. See id. § 6.01(a). cmt. a.at 398 (the objective of applying, to the extent feasible, a single
state's law to all similar tort claims); Ch. 6. Intro. Note. cmt. c. at 389 ("it would be highly desirable
if a single state's law could be applied"); § 6.01, cmt. a, at 398 ("the objective ... is to allow a
single state's tort law to apply to all similar claims").
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preprogrammed: only multilateral rules of the traditional variety can allocate
legal relationships to a particular state in a neutral, objective manner that is blind
to the legal consequences ensuing from the application of that state's law.
However, instead of laying down a single rule with a single connecting
factor, as the First Restatement did, the Reporters drafted an entire array of
provisions that, at first glance, look quite diverse.32 There is, first of all, an
introductory Subsection (a), which proclaims the Reporters' objective to have a
single state's law apply, if at all possible. Subsection (b) then lists such familiar
contact points (the Reporters call them "factors") as the place of injury, place of
conduct, and the parties' residence (or place of business). Having thus deferred
to the wisdom of the past," the Reporters, with a certain disdain for foolish
consistency, pay tribute to Currie's interest analysis; according to Subsection (c),
if the court finds that only one state "has a policy that would be furthered by
application of its law"-i.e., in a "false conflict"*4 situation-it is to apply the
law of the only interested state. In this fashion, the Project reflects the
eclecticism (or "mish-mash" methodology as a critic called it3l) so popular with
36
modem conflicts writers.
Should Section 6.01 become positive law, interest analysis is unlikely to play
much of a role in practical application. As the Reporters note at the outset, they
favor "reasonably precise choice of law rules"" and disdain the "intrinsic
indeterminacy"38 of interest analysis. Similarly, while they purport to follow
an issue-by-issue approach, 3 9 they reject the dipefage ° effect interest analysis
inevitably entails."' They also concede implicitly, if guardedly, that in complex
cases "false conflicts" will be as rare as hens' teeth. 2 Clearly, their preference
is for choice-of-law rules rather than freewheeling analysis; the talk about
policies and interests amounts to hardly more than a pro forma, face-saving
concession to current conflicts lore. Quite unsurprisingly, the four numbered
paragraphs following the nod to interest analysis contain rules of the traditional
ilk to resolve the "true conflicts" of state interests that supposedly result from a

32.

See id. Ch. 6,Intro. Note, at 376 ("a highly complex set of standards").

33.
34.

See Juenger, supra note 23, at 36-37.
See Robert A. Sedler, Across State Lines 37-39 (1989).

35.

William A. Reppy, Jr.. Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34

Mercer L. Rev. 645 (1983).
36. See Juenger. suspra note 23, at 140-43.
37. Proposed Final Draft, supra note I,Ch. 6, Intro. Note, at 376.
38. Id. cmt. c. at 386.
39.

See id.at 388.

40.

See id. Reporter's Note 9 to cmt. c,at 391 (warning against the polential for "anomalous

results" produced by a "hybrid law not available in any state"). The Reporters have apparently
misunderstood the French term. See id. Reporter's Note 9 to cmt. c. at 394 (attributing to it the
meaning of issue-by-issue analysis, rather than the resulting "hybrid law").
41. See Juenger, supra note 23, at 138-39.

42.

"[T]he identification of states leaving significant contacts often may suggest more than one

state whose law may be applied, particularly in the context of complex multiparty litigation."
Proposed Final Draft, supra note I,§ 6.01. cmt. a.at 398-99.
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clash and clang of policies.43

To this end the Reporters ostensibly blend

together personal and territorial contacts in the following way.
According to Paragraph (1) of Section 6.01(c), when injury and injurious
conduct occur in the same state, that state's law governs. If tort actions do not
take place in a single jurisdiction, Paragraph (2) provides that the state of
common residence"' of all plaintiffs furnishes the applicable law, as long as at
least one defendant also resides there.4 The same law controls, according to
Subsection (c), if no defendant has the required personal nexus with that state,

but the plaintiffs' common residence is also the place of injury.

Last, but

certainly not least, pursuant to Subsection (d) in all other cases-i.e., in the
overwhelming majority of dispersed mass disaster litigation, such as products
liability cases and air crashes-the law of the state of injurious conduct governs.
In the event such conduct occurred in more than one state, the second sentence
of Paragraph 47(4) picks the state with the "most significant relationship 6 to the
occurrence."
As the Reporters admit, in "most mass tort situations it is unlikely that all
the plaintiffs will reside in a single state." 48 The law of the place of conduct
will therefore apply in practically every case, either because it is also the place
of injury, which triggers Paragraph (I), or because of the "residual" rule
contained in Paragraph (4). Accordingly, Section 6.01 places primary reliance
on a territorial connecting factor, rather than the personal nexus interest analysts
prefer.4 9 As one might expect, the Reporters' territorialist preference, their
downgrading of analysis and their quest for invoking the law of a single state
s In effect, Section 6.01
have provoked strong reactions from interest analysts.5

43. Concerning my own doubts about interest analysis and the conundnms this approach
creates, see Juenger, supra note 23, at 131-39.
44. More precisely, Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, § 6.01(b)(3), (c)(2) and (3), define the
domiciliary connecting factor as the state in which parties "habitually reside" or have their "primary
places of business."
45. It should also be noted that the Proposed Official Draft establishes a fictive common
residence for plaintiffs from different states whose laws are not in material conflict. Id. § 6.01(c)(2).
second sentence.
46. By employing the Second Restatement's key phrase, the Reporters probably attempt to
suggest the affinity of their work product with the earlier A.L.I. endeavor.
47. The Reporters acknowledged that the term "most significant relationship" does not
necessarily provide a "quick or easy reference to the state where defendant's conduct ... occurred."
Proposed Final Drift. supra note I, §6.02, cmt. c.at 420. The reason is that such catchphrases mean
"nothing except, perhaps that the answer is not ready at hand." Rend David, The hitternational
Unification of Private Law, 2 Int'l Enc. Comp. L. ch. 5, § 16 (1969). That is of course their very
virtue; they afford judges a manipulatible margin to reach the right result. See Juenger, supra note
23, at 180-81. The use of such an amorphous connecting factor is, however, obviously at odds with
the Reporters' yearning for certainty, predictability, and uniformity.
48. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 6.01 cmt. a. at 403: see also id. cmt. b, at 415;
Mullenix, supra note 19, at 1641.
49. Concerning this preference, see Juenger. supra note 23, at 100-02, 131, 136-38.
50. See Louise Weinberg, Mass Torts at the Neutral Forum: A Critical Analysis of the ALi's
Choice Rule, 56 AIb. L. Rev. 807 (1993); Russell J. Weintraub. An Approach to Choice ofLaw That
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is an attempt to turn back the clock by substituting a hard and fast rule for the
more finely tuned approaches that scholars have developed and courts have
adopted in conflicts cases ever since Babcock v. Jackson"5 was decided more
than thirty years ago.
The Project's central choice-of-law provision is not only out of line with
current academic and judicial trends, it is also insensitive to results, as any rule
of the traditional kind must be. Multilateral conflicts systems cope with this
problem by allowing courts to disregard foreign laws that violate the forum's
public policy. 2 This option was not open to the Reporters because the
Project's gist is to render the notion of "forum" irrelevant." At the same time,
however, they realized that their choice-of-law rules can produce unacceptable
decisions. To avoid "unfair surprise or arbitrary results,"' 4 they included what
they choose to call the "safety valve"' " or "loophole provision"' 6 of Section
6.01(d). This Subsection permits a court to select the applicable law, whenever
appropriate, 7 by relying on "additional factors that reflect the regulatory
policies and legitimate interests of a particular state not otherwise identified
under Subsection (b)." Alternatively, Subsection (d) allows the court to depart
from the order of preferences for selecting the governing law specified in
Subsection (c). Finally, Subsection (e) recommends subclassing in the event that
the application of a single law to all elements of a claim would be "inappropriate."
Stripped of refinements and complexities, the thrust of the Reporters' scheme
for choosing the law that governs complex tort litigation is obvious: they favor
the application of a single law in mass disaster cases, a law determined by means
of a traditional connecting factor, namely, the state of defendant's conduct.'8
The obvious affinity between this basic rule and the tort provisions of the First
Restatement is by no means accidental. Like Beale, the Reporters were guided
by the classical desiderata of certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result.'
If, as they envisage, the Congress enacts Section 6.01 as part of a new chapter

Focuses on Consequences, 56 Alb. L. Rev. 701, 722-25 (1993); cf Robert A. Sedler, hIterest
Analysis,State Sovereignty, and Federally-Mandated Choice of Law in "Mass Tort" Cases, 56 AIb.
L. Rev. 855 (1993) (arguing against a federally imposed "law of a single jurisdiction" rule).
51.
191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).

52.

See Juenger, supra note 23, at 79-81.

53.

See Weinberg, supra note 50, at813-14.

54.
55.

Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1,§ 6.01(d).
Id. § 6.01, cmt. d,at 431.

56.

Proceedings. supra note 2.

57. The Proposed Final Draft empowered the court to rely on additional factors when
"necessary to avoid unfair surprise or arbitrary results." Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, §
6.01(d). During the Institute's 1993 annual meeting, the Reporters broadened this judicial discretion
by agreeing to substitute the word "appropriate" for "necessary." Proceedings, supra note 2;see
Weinberg, supra note 50, at 811 n.4.
58. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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of the Judiciary Act,60 the lex loci dellcti-redefined to mean the law of the
place of acting rather than injury-will once again reign supreme in the limited
but important area of mass disaster litigation.
In the following, I shall take issue with the objectives of Section 6 as well
as with the manner in which this provision attempts to implement them. I shall
limit my discussion to basics and refrain from going into details; cogent critiques
of fundamentals as well as specifics have already been published by Professors
Linda Mullenix 6' and Louise Weinberg. 62 Addressing only what I believe to
be the heart of the matter, I shall deal with two questions: (1) whether conflicts
solutions are preferable to substantive ones, and (2) whether, if conflicts solutions
must be used, the provisions of Section 6.02 are adequate to deal with the task
at hand.
Ill. CURRENT TRENDS IN AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW

To comment, once again, on the defects of the classical choice-of-law approach
is a tedious task. Yet the Reporters' reliance on value-blind multilateral rules
requires me to say at least a few words about the evolution of American conflicts
law. Once upon a time great jurists, such as Story 6 and Savigny,6 believed that
the primary task of the conflict of laws is the prevention of forum shopping and that
appropriately framed multilateral choice-of-law rules could achieve this goal. 6
But a century and a half of experimentation with the multilateral approach they
espoused has shown conclusively that certainty, predictability, and uniformity of
result will forever lie beyond the classical system's grasp.
Although this
realization is not limited .to the United States,67 in this country the judiciary's
reaction against the traditional approach has been especially forceful. A "conflicts
revolution6c' has swept our courts. While the peculiar American incarnation of
the multilateralist dogma, Joseph Beale's First Restatement, once was the law of
the land, 69 its authority is now limited to a dwindling minority of jurisdictions.70

60. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I. ch. I cmt. a, at 3 and Appendix A § 7 (proposed
amendments or 28 U.S.C.).
61. Mullenix, supra note 19.
62. Weinberg. supra note 50.
63. See Juenger, supra note 23. at 29-31.
64. See id. at 34-40.
65. See id. at 39.
66. See id. at 69-87, 154-63.
67. See id. at 152-53.
68. See id. at 106-20.
69. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws 134
(1984). But see Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws § 211 (1962).
70. For the latest nose count, see Luther L. McDougal. Ill, The Real Legacy of Babcock v.
Jackson: Lex Fori histead of Lex Loci Delicti and Now It's Time for a Real Choice-of.Law
Revoluion, 56 AIb. L. Rev. 795. 796 n.1 1(1993): Weintraub, .supra note 50, at 702 n.7 (37 states.
the District of Columbia. and Pueno Rico have abandoned the First Restatement's rule to embrace
modern approaches).
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The dominant American academic approach to choice of law is "governmental
interest analysis," a doctrine propounded by Brainerd Currie," which purports to
deduce the spatial reach of substantive rules from their underlying policies and
from the "interest" states are said to have in effectuating such policies." In
contrast to the classical multilateral methodology, Currie used rules of decision-rather than legal relationships-as his point of departure. Unlike the First
Restatement's rules, which submitted all substantive aspects of a given relationship
(e.g., a tort) to the law of one state (e.g., the state in which the injury occurred 3),
Currie's approach compels, of necessity, an issue-by-issue determination. Because
his approach is geared to analyzing substantive rules, it requires a separate analysis
with respect to each of the potentially applicable rules of decision. 4 At the same
time, Currie's hypothesis that states are primarily interested in persons-who pay
taxes and elect the government--emphasized the personal nexus between an
individual (or entity) and a legal system," whereas the First Restatement's search
for the spot in which rights vest 76 strongly favored territorial contacts.
77
Thus, by reinstituting the First Restatement's jurisdiction-selecting approach
and relying on a territorial contact as its principal connecting factor, 8 Section 6.01
is at odds with current American conflicts theory.' 9 Nor do its proposed choiceof-law rules jibe with current judicial practice. Following a wide variety of
academic teachings, American state and federal courts have adopted a panoply of
modem choice-of-law doctrines80 Although they habitually speak of "policies"
and "interests," the courts-unlike the majority of legal writers-are not wedded
to interest analysis. Instead, they rely-in a rather undiscerning fashion-on a
mdlange ofdiscordant methodologies, including Currie's, the Second Restatement's
eclectic proper law approach, and Leflar's better-law rule." But whatever
theories they profess to follow, in tort cases at least, few courts still apply a
mechanical approach resembling the First Restatement's place-of-injury rule or the
place-of-conduct rule enshrined in Section 6.01 of the Complex Litigation
Project. 2

71. See Roger C. Cramton ct al., Conflict of Laws, Cases-Commnts--Questions 150-51 (5th
ed. 1993); Weinberg, supra note 50, at 829-30. Most of Currie's conflicts essays are collected in
Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963).
72. See Juenger, supra note 23, at 98-103.
73. See id. at 48.
74. See id.at 102. 138-39.
75. See id. at 100-02. 131. 136-38.
76. See id. at 90-91.
77. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
79. For the reaction of interest analysis, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
80. See Juenger, spra note 23, at 106-20.
81.
See id.at 140, 153; Friedrich K. Juenger, Babcock v. Jackson Revisited: Judge Fuld's
Contribution to America,, Conflicts Low, 56 AIb. L. Rev. 727. 743-44 (1993); McDougal, supra note
70, at 797. 803; Weinberg. supra note 50.at 829-30; Sedler, sitlra note 50,at 855.
82. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

1994]

FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER

However confused and confusing the case law may be, two basic tendencies
are clearly discernible in American conflicts practice: (I) a strong forum
preference and (2) a preference for the sounder rule of decision. Since I have
commented on this phenomenon elsewhere, 83 and since it has been documented
statistically," it should suffice briefly to restate the reasons for the interrelationship between these tendencies. The forum bias inherent in the modern
approaches, which may cater to an instinctive judicial preference for local over
foreign law, as some observers have surmised,85 promotes recovery. In tort
cases, the lexfori usually favors the victim, who, as party plaintiff, selects the
forum. Rarely will counsel, with a contingent fee at stake, choose to sue in a
state whose law is unfavorable to the client's cause. Moreover, a judge who
prefers a foreign rule of decision to the local one is free to change the forum's
common law rule or, if need be, to hold a substandard local statute unconstitutional.
On occasion, however, courts do prefer the sounder foreign rule of
decision.86 Again, this preference should not come as a surprise. Judges are
apt to compare the relative merits of the tort rules from which they are asked to
make a selection, and comparison readily reveals qualitative differences. In
general, the law less favorable to the plaintiff will turn out to be aberrational.
In the past, the large majority of tort conflicts cases were prompted by such
obsolete and draconian precepts as guest statutes, or their functional equivalent,
common law rules on interspousal immunity, and, to a lesser extent, by arbitrary
limitations on wrongful death recovery.8 7 In part because of the "conflicts
revolution," which exposed their defects, these relics from a distant past have
The judicial reorientation simply mirrored, on the
largely become extinct.8
interstate level, the trend to enhance the protection of accident victims that was
so noticeable in domestic tort law. 89 Nowadays, the troublemakers are
misguided statutes enacted, as part of the tort law "reform" movement, in
response to a number of so-called "liability crises. '

83.

See Juenger. supra note 23. at 146-49.
84. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice.of.Law Revohtion: An Empirical Study, 49 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 357 (1992). But see McDougal. supra note 70. at 803-04 (a substantial number of
rules).
conflicts decisions apply substandard tort
85. See, e.g., Th. M. de Boer, Beyond Lex Loci Delicti 345-47 (1987); Robert A. Sedler,
ProfessorJuenger'sChallenge to the Interest AnalysisApproachto Choice-of.Law: An Appreciation
anda Response, 23 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 865, 896 (1990). But see Juenger, snpra note 23, at 199-203.
86. See, e.g., Schlemmer v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 217 (Ark. 1987); Bigelow
v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1981); Borchers, supra note 23, at 899 (with further references).
87. See Juenger, supra note 23, at 117-18, 146-49.
88. See id.; Juenger, supra note 81, at 746.
89. See Juenger, supra note 23, at 147.
90. See generally Marc A. Franklin & Robert L. Rabin. Ton Law and Alternatives, Cases and
Materials 710-15 (5th ed. 1992): W. Page Keeton eta.. Prosser and Keeton on Tons I (Supp. 1988);
McDougal. supra note 70. at 804.
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IV. SECTION 6.01 IN PRACTICAL APPLICATION

The Reporters' reliance on neutral, jurisdiction-selecting choice-of-law rules
that use the place of conduct as the principal connecting factor is not only at
odds with current academic theories but also defies a clear trend in American
practice. Paying homage to the traditional goals of certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result, they failed to heed the lessons of the past. The First
Restatement, which pursued the same objectives, became obsolete because of its
inability to produce sound results in tort cases. Oblivious to the obvious, the
Reporters attempted to resurrect what had proved to be a resounding failure.
Conceivably, their focus on procedural matters may have distracted them from
the consideration that procedure, however important it is, ought to be subservient
to the demands of material justice. In part, their attempt to revive an anachronism may also be explained by the well-known propensity of conflicts law to
befog the minds of judges and scholars.9
In practical application, Section 6.01 would prove to be worse than the First
Restatement's rigid rules. Rather than merely prompting an occasional harsh
result, its insensitive choice-of-law provisions would produce large-scale
miscarriages of justice. Moreover, the substantive setting in which the section
is to operate has been transformed. In the past, American tort law was largely
uniform, except for a small group of aberrational rules, such as guest statutes,
immunities, and arbitrary limitations on wrongful death recovery. While these
"drags on the coattails of civilization" 92 have by now largely disappeared, a new
wave of noxious statutes has taken their place. Agitation for "tort reform" 9 has
produced a motley array of laws lobbied by powerful and well organized special
interest groups. The manner in which these enactments curtail the rights of tort
victims differs from one state to the next. Among them are arbitrary caps on
damages, 94 stunted limitation periods, 95 "statutes of repose" that bar actions
before they arise,9' as well as provisions abolishing the collateral source
rule9 or joint and several liability,9 to name just a few of the products of
the lobbyists' fertile imagination. Furthermore, some legislatures have shown

91. See McDougal. supra note 70,at 804, 806; William L. Prosser, iterstate Publicationa, 51
Mich. L. Rev. 959, 971 (1953); cf Harold G. Maier, Finding the Trees its Spite of the Metaphorist:
The Problem of State Interests in Choice of LAw, 56 AIb. L. Rev. 753 (1993) (commenting on the
propensity of the term "interest" to lend coutns and scholars astray).
92. Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 209 (N.H. 1966) (commenting on a guest statute).
93. For obvious reasons, this term usually appears between quotation marks. See Franklin &
Rabin. supra note 90, at 71 I; Keeton elal.. supro note 90, at I.
94. See Franklin & Rabin. supra note 90,at 711. 712; Keeton etal., supra note 90, at I. 2.
95. See Franklin & Rabin, siqpra note 90,at 711, 712.
96. See id. at 712-13.
97.
98.

See id. at 712: Keeton et al.,
supra note 90. at 2.
See Franklin & Rabin, supra note 90. at 712: Keeton et al.. supra note 90. at I. 2.
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extraordinary solicitude towards certain professions, such as medical practitioners," manufacturers," ° and retailers.''
Since hardly two of the statutes enacted in response to the lobbyists'
pressures are alike,'0 2 American tort law, losing its former unity, has become
thoroughly chaotic. By now, the states of the Union are out of step not only
with the rest of the world, but also with one another. Moreover, the differences
among state laws are exacerbated by the fact that state courts have struck down
some of these enactments for constitutional reasons, while letting others
stand. 03 But the balkanization of American tort law and the curtailment of
victims' righis have done little to cure the "crises" such legislation was designed
to cure. As a renowned scholar observed:
Tort reform statutes in thirty-nine states have effected modest changes
of substantive and remedial law since the mid-70s .... Although
promoted by the insurance industry, they have not resulted in any
noticeable reduction of premiums, thereby fuelling the accusation that
the reform campaign was just a disingenuous attack on the deserved
gains of tort victims.'t°
Passed by state legislatures with local realities in mind,'03 even that portion
'
of the hodge-podge "reform"'O
legislation which has managed to survive
constitutional scrutiny cannot possibly aspire to become part of a "national
consensus law,"'017 to use Judge Weinstein's felicitous phrase. Yet, the undiscerning choice-of-law provisions of Section 6.01 confer upon such local special
interest legislation the status of interstate rules of decision. Even worse, the
Reporters' remarks about "state policies that legitimately reflect substantive,
regulatory rules"'08 suggest that these odious statutes can claim a privileged

99.

See Franklin & Rabin, supra note 90, at 711; Keeton etal., supra note 90, at I.
See Franklin & Rabin, supro note 90, at 712-13; Keeton et al., supra note 90, at I.
lOt. See Franklin & Rabin, supra note 90, at 713.
102. "lElach state took its own distinctive approach to tort reform. Even when the states began
with the same agenda, legislative compromise often produced quite disparate results." Id. at 712.
103. Compare Smith v.Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (striking down a
$450,000 ceiling on noneconomic damages) with Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665

100.

(Cal. 1985) (upholding a $250,000 ceiling on noneconomic damages for medical malpractice). See
also Weinberg, supra note 50. at 825.
104. John G. Fleming, The American Tort Process 24 (1988).
105. See Weinberg, supra note 50, at824. For a revealing study of the background and
ramifications of such legislation, see Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Offto the Races": The 1980s
Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. Rev. 207 (1990).
106. "By equating tort reform with unidirectional statutory modification of the common law, its
advocates succeeded in investing the term with a politically useful, if skewed, meaning." Joseph A.
Page, Defonning Tort Reform. Geo. L.J. 649. 651 (1990) (reviewing Peter W. Huber, Liability: The
Legal Revolution and Its Consequences (1988)).
107. Inre "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 713 (E.D.N.Y.1984).
108. Proposed Final Draft. supra note I. Ch. 6. Intro. Note. cmt. c. at 387. See also id. at 388
("regulatory interests"), 393 ("a legitimate regulatory interest").
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position. Few private law provisions have a more obvious regulatory purpose
than those enacted to shelter tortfeasors from victims' claims. Normal tort rules
merely embody the court's or legislature's endeavor to be fair. In contrast, the
"reform" legislation is designed, like a tax measure, to rob Peter to pay Paul,
which is of course precisely the reason why some of it has been held unconstitutional.' °9 Because the legislative objective is as clear as it is misguided, this
kind of legislation is considerably more policy-laden than ordinary tort rules, and
can therefore be said to express a stronger state "interest."" ° Paradoxically,

therefore, the lobbyists' work product may be entitled to greater deference than
the principles elaborated by such jurists as Cardozo, Schaeffer anc Traynor..
Even if state tort "reform" statutes are only entitled to the same respect as
ordinary tort rules, the Russian-roulette approach of Section 6.01 is bound to
invoke substandard provisions enacted to placate powerful lobbies with
considerable frequency. The propensity of indiscriminately importing foreign
rules of decision law without regard to their intrinsic quality, thereby producing
unpalatable results, was of course the very reason for the First Conflict
Restatement's demise."' In fact, even before the so-called "conflicts revolution" dethroned Beale's Restatement, American courts, in countless cases,
avoided the draconic outcomes its rules so often compelled by recourse to
various escape devices." 2 One should have thought that the example of a
Restatement discredited for its failure to do multistate justice would discourage
similar ventures. But, it seems, in the law of conflicts past errors inspire
emulation rather than caution.
To be sure, the Reporters were not entirely oblivious to the problems
substandard rules of decision can cause in mass disaster litigation. Eschewing

traditional escape devices," 3 they included instead the "loophole" provision of

109. For instance, as the New Hampshire Supreme Court said in striking down a limitation on
noneconomic damages in malpractice actions, "It is simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the
burden of supporting the medical care industry solely upon those persons who are most severely
injured and therefore most in need of compensation." Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H.
1980).
110. Concerning the possible differential treatment of different types of "interests" depending
on the regulatory policies they represent, see Sedler, supra note 50,at 872-73.
Ill. See Juenger, supra note 23, at 117-20. 146-49.
112. See id. at 96, 112, 116, 173-77.
113. Proposed Final Draft. supranote I, Ch. 6,Intro. Note. cmt. c,at 392 dismisses-in asingle
sentence that hardly does the much debated subject justice-the possibility of renvoi. The Reporters
never even discuss the characterization problem to which they cursorily refer in a reporter's note.
See id. § 6.03, Reporter's Note 8 to cmt. b, at 468. Apparently they assume that the difference
between, for instance, tort and contract law is sufficiently clear so as not to warrant comment.
Several products liability cases, however, shed doubt on this assumption. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Knight, 459 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (contract characterization); Bohrer-Reagan Corp. v.
Modine Mfg. Co., 433 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (same). See also Mullenix, supra note 19. at
1642-43 nn.82. 84. The modern methodologies serve to obliterate the traditional categories. Robert
A. Leflar et al., American Conflicts Law § 134, at 377 (4th ed. 1986). By resurrecting an earlier
approach and establishing separate provisions for tort and contract choice of law, the Proposed Final
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Section 6.01(d). While this subsection does grant courts some wiggle room, its
dimensions are far from clear. Should the Project be enacted into positive law,
judges, heeding the Reporters' call for uniformity, can be expected-at least
initially-to construe this exception cautiously and narrowly. Accordingly,
Section 6.01(d) is probably but "a thin reed on which to rest [the] argument that
the specific rule of (c)(4) should not apply.""'
For this reason, neither the
loophole rule nor the other palliatives found in Section 6.01"' are apt to
prevent the unfair results the place-of-conduct rule inevitably compels. Although
they do undercut, to some extent, the quest for predictability and uniformity of
result, the Project's fudge factors fail to offer the same measure of protection
against the application of substandard law as the classic public policy reservation.
Section 6.01 thus resuscitates tenets that have long been found wanting and
promotes the large-scale influx of special interest legislation into complex
litigation. In addition to seriously jeopardizing the interests of mass disaster
victims, it jeopardizes its own avowed objective of resolving complex cases in
an evenhanded manner."16 The Reporters' reliance on the place of conduct, a
contact that is often fortuitous and usually manipulatable," 7 leaves to happenstance and defense strategies the decision who recovers what, if anything, when
an airplane crashes or a noxious drug causes worldwide injuries. Furthermore,
Section "6.01 would cause additional disparities in current conflicts practice. It
requires federal courts to apply federal choice-of-law rules in mass disaster cases,
but state choice-of-law rules in all others."'
Secondly, it discriminates
between mass disaster cases adjudicated in federal court and those adjudicated
in state courts, and thereby invites forum shopping.' 9 Finally, by compelling
subclassing in dispersed mass tort cases, this section is bound to defeat the
Project's consolidation objective.' 20
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MASS DISASTERS

Before looking for alternatives to the Project's hard and fast choice-of-law
rules, it may not be remiss to recall how federal judges used to deal with
interstate torts and mass disasters. Until 1934 choice-of-law problems rarely
arose in federal courts. Following Swift v. T'yson,12 1 they applied a general
federal common law to cases that were interstate in nature by virtue of the

0
Draft reintroduces the hoary characterization problem.
114. Weintraub. supra note 50, at 723.
115. For an example of such palliatives, § 6.01(c), first sentence, invites a search for false
conflicts. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Other examples include the "most significant
relationship" formula found in § 6.01(c)(4), and the subclassing possibility afforded by § 6.01(d).
116. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; Borchers, supra note 23, at 895.
117. See Weinberg, supra note 50. at 848: Weintraub, supra note 50. at 722, 723.
118. See Mullenix, suipra note 19, at 1634.
119. See id.
at 1646-47, 1657.
120. See id. at 1630-31. 1644-45.
121. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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parties' diversity of citizenship. Swift of course dealt with a negotiable
instrument, and Justice Story's reference to the ius gentium' 22 was limited to
commercial law. But when the federal courts expanded its rationale to
encompass torts, they encountered no difficulty whatsoever in developing a body
of substantive rules. Nor did mass disasters daunt the federal judiciary. Prior
to the advent of more modern modes of transportation, vessels provided the
principal means of long-distance travel. Mishaps in the course of voyages were
within the admiralty jurisdiction granted by Article III, section 2, clause 3 of the
Constitution, 2 ' and the federal judiciary construed this bare jurisdictional grant
24
broadly to authorize the development of an entire federal maritime law.'
Thus, whether they dealt with single torts or large-scale catastrophes, such as
ship or train wrecks, federal judges did not leave the rights of accident victims
to the tender mercies of choice-of-law rules. Instead, they developed a
substantive law that dealt directly with the mass disasters of yore.
This brief glance at the past shows that the federal courts were perfectly
capable of developing tort rules of decision for mass disasters as well as for
other cases, 23 which obviated the need for choice-of-law rules. If judicial cris
de coeur are any indication, the perceived need for a uniform national law is no
less pressing in aerial than in aquatic disasters.' 26 Lacking the necessary
foresight, the Founding Fathers only provided for admiralty jurisdiction. One
may, however, surmise that had they been enrolled in frequent flyer plans they
would not have been averse to including other forms of interstate and international transportation. But even in the absence of a specific constitutional provision
akin to the admiralty clause, it can hardly be denied that equal justice in mass
disaster cases would be considerably enhanced by a uniform body of federal

122. Id. at 19.
123. U.S. Const. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3.
124. See Frank L. Maraist, Admiralty in a Nutshell 3-5 (1983).
125. For a vote of confidence in the federal judiciary's ability to develop acceptable common
law rules, see Vairo, supra note 16, at 219 n.349.
126. See, e.g., i re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979. 644 F.2d 594.
632-33 (7Th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878, 102 S. Ct. 358 (1981); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines.
Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 403-04 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978. 95 S. C1. 1980 (1975). As
Justice Jackson once said:

We arc at a stage in development of air commerce roughly comparable to that of
steamship navigation in 1824.
Aviation has added a new dimension to travel and to our ideas.
Students of our legal evolution know how this Court interpreted the commerce clause
of the Constitution to lift navigable waters of the United States out of local controls and
into the domain of federal control ....
Air as an element in which to navigate is even
more inevitably federalized by the commerce clause than is navigable water.
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292. 302-03. 64 S. Ct. 950 (1944) (Jackson, J..
concurring).
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law.' 27 As the Project's Reporters concede, to leave the outcome of complex

litigation to the vagaries of state case law and statutes, especially the kind state
legislatures have enacted in the last decade, is an imperfect solution at best. 2 ,
Why, then, did the Project's Reporters reject a federal resolution to what
they correctly identified as a "national problem"? 2 9 Acknowledging that the

most direct way of dealing with the law applicable to mass disasters would be
to adopt national standards, they nevertheless doubted that the Congress could
be expected to "intrude ...into areas historically governed by state law."' 3°

For this reason they dismissed-in one paragraph and without analysis-what
they recognized as the preferable solution. Such short shrift is remarkable,
especially since the Reporters do not point to any constitutional provision that

would inhibit the elaboration of federal tort rules for complex cases. That the
Congress has the power to adopt such rules is of course beyond cavil, as the
Reporters implicitly conceded. 13' Equally within the power of Congress would
be a statute empowering federal courts to create such rules on their own, an
alternative the Reporters did not address.'32 Indeed, but for the choice-of-law
rules set forth in Chapter 6, the federal judiciary might well choose to develop
such a common law on its 3own, just as it did in admiralty on the basis of a
simple jurisdictional grant.

The Reporters' failure seriously to consider a federal common law for mass

3
disasters, a possibility thoughtfully and convincingly argued in two articles"
they cited, 3 is astonishing. 3 6 One can empathize with their reluctance to

entrust the task of formulating substantive rules to Congress, whose legislative

127. See Vairo, supra note 16, at 172, 181-84. 206, 224.
128. Proposed Final Draft, sutpra note I, Ch. 6. Intro. Note, at376.
129. Id. at 375.
130. Id. For a more optimistic view, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Mass Torts atd the Conflict
L. Rev. 157, 172-74.
of Laws: The Airline Disaster, 1989 U. I11.
131. Their scruples are of apolitical, rather than constitutional, nature. See Proposed Final Draft,
supra note I, Ch. 6, Intro. Note, at 375. For a full discussion of the constitutional issues, see Vairo,
supra note 16, at 174-208.
132. The Proposed Final Draft merely discusses the possibility of a congressional authorization
to develop a federal common law of conflicts and, without mentioning admiralty, notes the absence
of uniform federal liability laws. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, Ch. 6. Intro. Note, at 37576; cmt. c, at 386; Reporter's Note 7 to cmt. c, at 394.
133. Cf.Vairo, supra note 16. at 203-08 (28 U.S.C. § 1487 (1982) evidences federal interests).
134. Vairo. supra note 16. at 172-84. 218-24; Mullenix. supra note 19, at 1631, 1634-35, 166162. But see Lowenfeld. supra note 130. at 170-72.
135. See Proposed Final Draft. supra note I, Ch. 6,Intro. Note, Reporter's Note 7 to cmt. c, at

394.
136. Although they briefly allude to the possibility of a "national consensus approach," which
they equate with the creating of a federal common law, the Reporters reject this possibility out of
hand because of asserted "federalism restraints" and sensitivity to state interests. See id. § 6.01. cmt.
c, at 423 and Reporter's Note 14 to cmt. c, at 425. The Reporters' neglect is all the more remarkable
given the fact that the Tydings Bill, drafted more than a quarter century ago, which provided for the
transfer and consideration of air crash litigation, already contained aprovision authorizing the federal
courts to create a federal common law. See Lowenfeld, supra note 130, at 170.
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record in the field of torts is spotty at best.'
But no similar reasons caution
against leaving the matter to federal judges, who can rely on a fully formed body
of case law, including-and that covers the bulk of mass disaster
cases-products liability rules,' which they developed in the maritime context. Whatever adjustments may conceivably be required to adapt this body of
law to nonmaritime situations should pose no insurmountable obstacles. To say
that mass disaster litigation was "historically governed by state law"'39
overlooks the experience federal courts have gathered in the realm of torts 4 °
and is therefore, at the very least, misleading. One suspects that the real reasons
for the Reporters' rejection of an alternative that is so clearly superior to their
proposal are of an instinctive, subliminal nature.' 4' Indications that this
surmise may not be too far off the mark are their ritual incantations of "basic
principles of federalism,"' 42 "states' rights,"' 4 3 federalism "concerns"'" and
"restraints," 141 "state interests,"'14 6 and their apparent particular fondness of
what they call a "vigorous body of state law.' 47
The Reporters' comments sound like an allusion to the Erie'48 doctrine,
although they surely recognize that Erie would not preclude the adoption of a
federal common law to govern situations that are interstate by their very
nature.'49 Clearly, the states' rights rationale Justice Brandeis invoked in a
case dealing with a hapless hiker hit by an open door while walking along
railroad tracks has little pertinence to mass disasters such as air crashes or cases
involving noxious drugs that are distributed worldwide. In situations that so
clearly transcend state and even national boundaries, there are no good reasons

137. The Federal Tort Claims Act, for instance, not only left the tort responsibility of the federal
government to the vagaries of state laws, but used a connecting factor that caused renvoi problems.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1989); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 585 (1962). The
Congress has proved to be equally inept in passing interstitial legislation. The Death on the High
Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1988), for example. failed to include fatal torts in coastal waters.
compelling the Supreme Court to cure this deficiency by case law. See Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970). For skepticism concerning the Congress's ability
to fashion sensible statutory rules for mass disaster cases see Vairo. supra note 16, at 219 n.349.
138. See Maraist, supra note 124, at 138-44.
139, Proposed Final Draft, supra note I, Ch. 6, Intro. Note, at 375.
140. For recent contributions on the subject, see Admiralty Law lIstitute Symposium: The
American Law of Personal hIjury and Death, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 311 (1994).
141. According to Professor Mullenix, "the legal profession has a long standing, collective
psychological block with regard to even the mention of federal common law." Mullenix, supra note
19, at 1635. But see Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal
Positivism. and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 79 (1993).
142. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, Ch. I. at 7.
143. Id. Ch. 6, Intro. Note, cmt. c, at 389.
144. Id. § 6.01, Reporter's Note 4 to cint. a, at 409.
145. Id. § 6.01, cmt. c, at 423; see also id. at 425 (rejection of federal common law).
146. Id. at 423.
147. Id. Ch. 6, Intro. Note, Reporter's Note 4 to cmt. b. at 385.
148, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938).
149. See Vairo, supra note 16, at 174-84.
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for leaving the parties' rights and obligations to the vagaries of state laws,
especially at a time when the states' "vigorous lawmaking" has reached new
lows in the wake of the so-called tort law "reform" movement. s Whatever
deference may be due and owing to state prerogatives should not encompass
legislation that reflects a peculiar predilection to protect privileged local
defendants. Such solicitude is already questionable in entirely local situations; 31t it is doubly so if privileges are granted at the expense of foreign
victims and to the detriment of interstate justice.
If, however, the creation of a federal common law for mass disasters should
be considered too bold a step to take,5 2 there is an alternative that relies on
conflicts rules rather than substantive law. Remaining within the Reporters'
framework of using state rules of decision and federal choice-of-law provisions,
sensible results in complex tort cases can be reached if the choice of the
applicable law is contingent on the merits of competing rules of decision. This
idea, which has more than casual affinity with Judge Weinstein's "national
consensus law,"'"3 can serve as the basis for a choice-of-law rule of the kind
I presented to the American Law Institute's membership. My proposed
alternative reference rule reads as follows:
§ 6.01 Mass Torts
(a) In actions consolidated under § 3.01 in which the parties
assert the application of laws that are in material conflict the
transferee court shall choose the rules of decision governing the
rights, liabilities, and defenses of the parties with respect to a tort
claim in the manner specified below.
(b) In selecting the appropriate rules of decision the court shall
consider the laws of the following jurisdictions:
(1) the place or places of injury;
(2) the place or places of the conduct causing the
injury; and
(3) the principal places of business or habitual residences of the plaintiffs and defendants.
(c) With respect to each issue, the court shall select from the
laws of these jurisdictions the rule of decision
that most closely
5 4
accords with modern tort law standards,

150. See sispra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
151.
For the doubtful constitutionality of such "reform" legislation, see supra note 103 and
accompanying text.
152. "IThe notion of general federal common law has never recovered from Erie and Justice
Holmes's famous dictum about the 'brooding omnipresence in the sky.'" Mullenix, supra note 19,
at 1635. See also Lowenfeld. supra note 130, at 170-72.
153. See suspra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
154. Proceedings. supra note 2.
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As noted earlier,"' on May 13, 1993, the American Law Institute's
membership voted down my motion to substitute these provisions for Section
6.01056 It also voted down motions by Professor Louise Weinberg and the late
Professor Donald Trautman,' 7 which likewise were designed to assure a
measure of quality control in selecting the law applicable to complex tort
cases."' 8 Accordingly, Section 6.01, "recycling tired conflicts principles and
adapting them, Rube Goldberg fashion, to a bigger tort model,"'5 9 remained
intact, subject only to minor modifications 6° It is regrettable that the Reporters have resisted the invitation to reconsider their approach in spite of the
vigorous opposition by conflicts teachers of otherwise vastly differing views, and
that the House supported the Reporters' insistence on resuscitating an approach
that has long been found wanting.
Creating rather than resolving problems, Section 6.01 cannot possibly attain
the Reporters' fundamental objective of "fostering the fair, just, and efficient
resolution"' 6' of complex tort litigation. By opting for an admittedly imperfect
solution 62 that requires a cumbersome set of standards, 63 they have created
unnecessary obstacles to the hoped-for enactment of their work product into
positive law. In addition, as the Reporters realize, the needless introduction of
choice-of-law conundrums is counterproductive to the goal of consolidating
dispersed litigation."
Moreover, the Reporters swept under the rug the
problems that beset all multilateral schemes,' 65 such as renvoi and
characterization.'6 The Congress would therefore be ill-advised to promulgate
the Project without first excising the deeply flawed provisions of Section 6.01,
which sacrifice the rights of mass disaster victims without any corresponding
gain. One can only hope that fairness and common sense will ultimately prevail
and that the Congress, in the interest of substantial justice, will choose to
authorize either the development of a federal common law to govern mass
disasters cases or an appropriate alternative reference rule.
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See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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Proceedings, supra note 2. The motion did not surprise the reporters, as I had advocated

the adoption of such a rule on earlier occasions. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disasters and the
Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 105, 126; What Now?, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 509. 517 (1985). The
Reporters cited both of these articles. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 1, § 6.01, Reporter's
Note 6 to cmt. a, at 410; id. Reporter's Note 16 to cmt. e, at 425.
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